This version corrects a few minor typos.
Introduction
The problem. This paper continues the study of password-based protocols for authenticated key exchange (AKE). We consider the scenario in which there are two entities|a client A and a server B|where A holds a password pw and B holds a key related to this. The parties would like to engage in a conversation at the end of which each holds a session key, sk, which is known to nobody but the two of them. There is present an active adversary A whose capabilities include enumerating, o -line, the words in a dictionary D, this dictionary being rather likely to include pw. In a protocol we deem \good" the adversary's chance to defeat protocol goals will depend on how much she interacts with protocol participants|it won't signi cantly depend on her o -line computing time.
The above protocol problem was rst suggested by Bellovin and Merritt 6] , who also o er a protocol, Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE), and some informal from, but related to, the one we are considering. Some critiques of 14] are made by 9], who also give their own, simulation-based notion for password-based UA.
In contemporaneous work to ours MacKenzie and Swaminathan 18], building on 3, 14], give de nitions and proofs for a password-based MA protocol, and then a protocol that combines MA and AKE. Boyko, MacKenzie and Patel 10], building on 1, 20], give de nitions and a proof for a Di e-Hellman based protocol. In both papers the authors' motivation is fundamentally the same as our own: to have practical and provably secure password-based protocols. Ongoing work. In 5] we provide a simple AKE protocol for the asymmetric trust model: the client holds pw and the server holds f(pw), where f is a oneway function. If the adversary corrupts the server she must still expend time proportional to the quality of the password. We are working on the analysis. We are also investigating the security of EKE2 when its encryption function E is instantiated by E pw (x) = x H(pw) where H is a random oracle and the arithmetic is in the underlying group.
Model
The model described in this section is based on that of 3, 4] . In particular we take from there the idea of modeling instances of principals via oracles available to the adversary; modeling various kinds of attacks by appropriate queries to these oracles; having some notion of partnering; and requiring semantic security of the session key via Test queries. Protocol participants. We x a nonempty set ID of principals. Each principal is either a client or a server: ID is the union of the nite, disjoint, nonempty sets Client and Server. Each principal U 2 ID is named by a string, and that string has some xed length. When U 2 ID appears in a protocol ow or as an argument to a function, we mean to the string which names the principal. Fig. 1 . The model. The protocol is P, the LL-key generator is PW , and the session-key space is SK. Probablity space depends on the model of computation.
Executing the protocol. Formally, a protocol is just a probabilistic algorithm taking strings to strings. This algorithm determines how instances of the principals behave in response to signals (messages) from their enviornment. It is the adversary who sends these signals. As with the LL-key generator, P may depend on h.
Adversary A is a probabilistic algorithm with a distinguished query tape.
Queries written on this tape are answered as speci ed in Figure 1 . The following English-language description may clarify what is happening.
During the exeuction there may be running many instances of each principal U 2 ID. We call instance i of principal U an oracle, and we denote it i U . Each instance of a principal might be embodied as a process (running on some machine) which is controlled by that principal.
A client-instance speaks rst, producing some rst message, Flow1. A serverinstance responds with a message of its own, Flow2, intended for the clientinstance which sent Flow1. This process is intended to continue for some xed number of ows (usually 2{5), until both instances have terminated. By that time each instance should have accepted, holding a particular session key (SK), session id (SID), and partner id (PID). Let us describe these more fully.
At any point in time an oracle may accept. When an oracle accepts it holds a session key sk, a session id sid, and a partner id pid. Think of these values as having been written on a write-only tape. The SK is what the instance was aiming to get. It can be used to protect an ensuing conversation. The SID is an identi er which can be used to uniquely name the ensuing session. It is also useful de nitionally. The PID names the principal with which the instance believes it has just exchanged a key. The SID and PID aren't secret|indeed we will hand them to the adversary|but the SK certainly is. A client-instance and a serverinstance can accept at most once. Remark 1. In this paper we use session IDs as our approach to de ning partnering. This idea springs from discussions in 1995 among Bellare, Petrank, Racko , and Rogaway. In 3] the authors de ne partnering via \matching conversations," while in 4] the authors de ne partnering by way of an existentially guaranteed partnering function. Though all three approaches are reasonable, the use of matching-conversations can be criticized as focussing on a syntactic element that is ultimately irrelevant, while partnering via an existentially-guarateed partnering function allows for some unintuitive partnering functions. An explicit SID seems an elegant way to go. Speci cation document de ning \real" protocols (eg., SSL and IPSec) typically do have SIDs, and in cases where an SID was not made explicit one can readilly de ne one (eg., by the concatenation of all protocol ows). 2 Remark 2. We emphasize that accepting is di erent from terminating. When an instance terminates, it is done|it has what it wants, and won't send out any further messages. But an instance may wish to accept now, and terminate later. This typically happens when an instance believes it is now holding a good session key, but, prior to using that key, the instance wants con rmation that its desired communication partner really exists, and is also holding that same session key. The instance can accomplish this by accepting now, but waiting for a con rmation message to terminate. The distinction between terminating and accepting may at rst seem arti cial, but the distinction is convenient and it is typical of real MA protocols. It can be seen as an \asymmetry-breaking device" for dealing with the well-known issue that the party who sends the last ow is never sure if it was received. 2
Our communications model places the adversary at the center of the universe.
The adversary A can make queries to any instance: she has an endless supply of i U oracles (U 2 ID and i 2 N). There are all together six types of queries that A can make. The responses to these queries are speci ed in Figure 1 . We now explain the capability that each kind of query captures. The oracle computes what the protocol says to, and sends back the response. Should the oracle accept, this fact, as well as the SID and PID, will be made visible to the adversary. Should the oracle terminate, this too will be made visible to the adversary. To initiate the protocol with client A trying to enter into an exchange with server B the adversary should send message M = B to an unused instance of A. A Send-query models the real-world possibility of an adversary A causing an instance to come into existence, for that instance to receive communications fabricated by A, and for that instance to respond in the manner prescribed by the protocol.
(2) Reveal (U; i) | If oracle i U has accepted, holding some session key sk, then this query returns sk to the adversary. This query models the idea (going back to Denning and Sacco 12] ) that loss of a session key shouldn't be damaging to other sessions. A session key might be lost for a variety of reasons, including hacking, cryptanalysis, and the prescribed-release of that session key when the session is torn down. . This query models the possibility of subverting a principal by, for example, witnessing a user type in his password, installing a \Trojan horse" on his machine, or hacking into a machine. Obviously this is a very damaging type of query. Allowing it lets us deal with forward secrecy and the extent of damage which can be done by breaking into a server. A Corrupt query directed against a client U may also be used to replace the value of pw B U] used by server B. This is the role of the second argument to Corrupt. Including this capability allows a dishonest client A to try to defeat protocol aims by installing a strange string as a server B's transformed password pw B A]. have not been used, this call carries out an honest execution of the protocol between these oracles, returning a transcript of that execution. This query may at rst seem useless since, using Send queries, the adversary already has the ability to carry out an honest execution between two oracles. Yet the query is essential for properly dealing with dictionary attacks. In modeling such attacks the adversary should be granted access to plenty of honest executions, since collecting these involves just passive eavesdropping. The adversary is comparatively constrained in its ability to actively manipulate ows to the principals, since bogus ows can be auditied and punative measures taken should there be too many. If it lands b = 1, then a random session key, drawn from the distribution from which session keys are supposed to be drawn, is returned. This type of query is only used to measure adversarial success|it does not correspond to any actual adversarial ability. You should think of the adversary asking this query just once.
(6) Oracle (M) | Finally, we give the adversary oracle access to a function h, which is selected at random from some probability space . As already remarked, not only the adversary, but the protocol and the LL-key generator may depend on h. Figure 1 refers to probability space . We consider three possiblities for , giving rise to three di erent models of computation.
In the standard model is the distribution which puts all the probability mass on one function: the constant function which returns the empty-string, ", for any query M. So in the standard model, all mention of h can be ignored.
Fix a nite set of strings C. In the ideal-hash model (also called the randomoracle model) choosing a random function from means choosing a random function h from f0; 1g to C. This models the use of a cryptographic hash function which is so good that, for purposes of analysis, one prefers to think of it as a public random function.
Fix nite sets of strings G and C where jGj = jCj. In the ideal-cipher model choosing a random function h from amounts to giving the protocol (and the adversary) a perfect way to encipher strings in G: namely, for K 2 f0; 1g , we set E K : G ! C to be a random bijective function, and we let E K : f0; 1g ! G be de ned by D K (y) is the value x such that E K (x) = y, if y 2 C, and bad otherwise. We let h(encrypt; K; M) = E K (M) and h(decrypt; K; C) = D K (C).
The capabilities of the ideal-hash model further include those of the ideal-cipher model, by means of a query h(hash; x) which, for shorthand, we denote H(x).
The ideal-cipher model is very strong (even stronger than the ideal-hash model) and yet there are natural and apparently-good ways to instantiate an Fig. 2 . Session-key freshness. A Test query is made to oracle i U . The chart speci es how, at the end of the execution, the session key of that oracle should be regarded (fresh or unfresh, and fs-fresh or fs-unfresh). Notation is described in the accompanying text.
ideal cipher for use in practical protocols. See 8] . Working in this model does not render trivial the goals that this paper is interested in, and it helps make for protocols that don't waste any bits. A protocol will always have a clearlyindicated model of computation for which it is intended so, when the protocol is xed, we do not make explicit mention of the model of compuation. Remark 6. The ideal-cipher model is richer than the RO-model, and you can't just say \apply the Feistel construction to your random oracle to make the cipher." While this may be an approach to instantiating an ideal-cipher, there is no formal sense we know in which you can simulate the ideal-cipher model using only the RO-model. 2 
De nitions
Our de nitional approach is from 4], but adaptations must be made since partnering is de ned in a di erent manner than in 4] (as discussed in Section 2), and since we now consider forward secrecy as one of our goals.
Partnering using SIDs. Fix a protocol P, adversary A, LL-key generator PW , and session-key space SK. Run P in the manner speci ed in Section 2. In this execution, we say that oracles i U and i 0 U 0 are partnered (and each oracle is said to be a partner of the other) if both oracles accept, holding (sk; sid; pid) and (sk 0 ; sid 0 ; pid 0 ) respectively, and the following hold:
(1) sid = sid 0 and sk = sk 0 and pid = U 0 and pid 0 = U. U 0 accepts with a PID of pid. The above de nition of partnering is quite strict. For two oracles to be partners with one another they should have the same SID and the same SK, one should be a client and the other a server, each should think itself partnered with the other, and, nally, no third oracle should have the same SID. Thus an oracle that has accepted will have a single partner, if it has any partner at all. Two flavors of freshness. Once again, run a protocol with its adversary. Suppose that the adversary made exactly one Test query, and it was to i U .
Intuitively, the oracle i U should be considered unfresh if the adversary may know the SK contained within it.
In Figure 2 we de ne two notions of freshness|with and witout forward secrecy (fs). Here is the notation used in that gure. We say \RevealTo (U; i)" is true i there was, at some point in time, a query Reveal (U; i). We say \RevealToPartnerOf (U; i)" is true i there was, at some point in time, a query Reveal (U 0 ; i 0 ) and i 0 U 0 is a partner to i U . We say \SomebodyWasCorrupted" is true i there was, at some point in time, a query Corrupt (U 0 ; pw) for some U 0 ; pw. We say \SomebodyWasCorruptedBeforeTheTestQuery" is true i there was a Corrupt (U 0 ; pw) query and this query was made before the Test (U; i) query. We say that \Manipulated(U; i)" is true i there was, at some point in time, a Send (U; i; M) query, for some string M.
Explanation. In our de nition of security we will be \giving credit" to the adversary A if she speci es a fresh (or fs-fresh) oracle and then correctly identi es if she is provided the SK from that oracle or else a random SK. We make two cases, according to whether or not \forward secrecy" is expected. Recall that forward secrecy entails that loss of a long-lived key should not compromise already-distributed session keys.
Certainly an adversary can know the SK contained within an oracle i U if she did a Reveal query to i U , or if she did a Reveal query to a partner of i U . This accounts for the rst two disjuncts in each condition of Figure 2 . The question is whether or not a Corrupt query may divulges the SK. Remember that a Corrupt query does not return the SK, but it does return the LL-key. For the \basic" notion of security (fresh/unfresh) we pessimistically assume that a Corrupt query does reveal the session key, so any Corrupt query makes all oracles unfresh. (One could tighten this a little, if desired.) For the version of the de nition with forward secrecy a Corrupt query may reveal a SK only if the Corrupt query was made before the Test query. We also require that the Test query was to an oracle that was the target of a Send query (as opposed to an oracle that was used in an Execute query). (Again, this can be tightened up a little.) This acts to build in the following requirement: that even after the Corrupt query, session keys exchanged by principals who behave honestly are still fs-fresh. This is a nice property, and since it seems to always be achieved in protocols which achieve forward secrecy, we have lumped it into that notion. It amounts to saying that an \honest" oracle|one that is used only for an Execute call|is always fs-fresh, even if there is a Corrupt query. (Of course you still have to exclude the the possiblity that the oracle was the target of a Reveal query, or that its partner was.) Remark 7. Forward secrecy, in the strong-corruption model, is not achievable by two-ow protocols. The di culty is the following. A two-ow protocol is clientto-server then server-to-client. If the client oracle is corrupted after the server oracle has terminated but before the client oracle has received the response, then the server oracle will be fs-fresh but the adversary can necessarilly compute the shared SK since the adversary has the exact same information that the client oracle would have had the client oracle received the server oracle's ow.
One way around this is to go to the weak-corruption model. A second way around this is to add a third ow to the protocol. A nal way around this is to de ne a slightly weaker notion of forward secrecy, weak forward-secrecy, in which an oracle is regarded as \wfs-unfresh" if it fs-unfresh, or the test query is to a manipulated oracle, that oracle is unpartnered at termination, and somebody gets corrupted. Otherwise the oracle is wfs-fresh. 2 AKE security (with and without forward secrecy). In a protocol execution of P; PW ; SK ; A we say that A wins, in the AKE sense, if she asks a single The ake advantage of A in attacking (P; PW ; SK) is twice the probability that A wins, minus one. (The adversay can trivially win with probability 1=2. Multiplying by two and subtracting one simply rescales this probability.) We denote the ake advantage by Adv ake P;PW ;SK (A).
We similarly de ne the ake-fs advantage, Adv ake-fs P;PW ;SK (A), where now one insists that the oracle i U to which the Test-query is directed be fs-fresh.
Authentication. In a protocol execution of P; PW ; SK ; A, we say that an adversary violates client-to-server authentication if some server oracle terminates but has no partner oracle. We let the c2s advantage be the probablity of this event, and denote it by Adv c2s P;PW ;SK (A). We say that an adversary violates server-to-client authentication if some client oracle terminates but has no partner oracle. We let the s2c advantage be the probability of this event, and denote it by Adv s2c P;PW ;SK (A). We say that an adversary violates mutual authentication if some oracle terminates, but has no partner oracle. We let the ma advantage denote the probablity of this event, and denote it by Adv ma P;PW ;SK (A). Measuring adversarial resources. We are interested in an adversary's maximal advantage in attacking some protocol as a function of her resources. The resources of interest are: t | the adversary's running time. By convention, this includes the amount of space it takes to describe the adversary. q se , q re , q co , q ex , q or | these count the number of Send, Reveal, Corrupt, Execute, and Oracle queries, respectively. When we write Adv ake P;PW ;SK (resources), overloading the Adv-notation, it means the maximal possible value of Adv ake P;PW ;SK (A) among all adversaries that expend at most the speci ed resources. By convention, the time to sample in PW (one time) and to sample in SK (one time) are included in Adv P;PW ;SK (resources) (for each type of advantage). Diffie-Hellman assumption. We will prove security under the computational Di e-Hellman assumption. The concrete version of relevance to us is the following. Let G = hgi be a nite group. We assume some xed representation for group elements, and implicitly switch between group elements and their string representations. Let A be an adversary that outputs a list of group elements, where the maximum is over all adversaries that run in time at most t and output a list of q group elements. As before, t includes the description size of adversary A.
Secure AKE: Protocol EKE2
In this section we prove the security of the two ows at the center of Bellovin and Merritt's EKE protocol 6]. Here we de ne the (slightly modi ed) \piece" of EKE that we are interested in. Description of EKE2. This is a Di e-Hellman key exchange in which each ow is enciphered by the password, the SK is sk = H(A k B k g x k g y k g xy ), and the SID and PID are appropriately de ned. The name of the sender also accompanies the rst ow. See Figures 3 and 4 .
Arithmetic is in a nite cyclic group G = hgi. This group could be G = Z ? p , or it could be a prime-order subgroup of this group, or it could be an elliptic curve group. We denote the group operation multiplicatively. The protocol uses a cipher E : Password G ! C, where pw A 2 Password for all A 2 Client.
There are many concrete constructions that could be used to instantiate such an object; see 8]. In the analysis this is treated as an ideal cipher. Besides the cipher we use a hash function H. It outputs`-bits, where`is the length of the session key we are trying to distribute. Accordingly, the session-key space SK associated to this protocol is f0; 1g`equipped with a uniform distribution.
Security theorem. The following indicates that the security of EKE2 is about as good as one could hope for. We consider the simple case where Password has size N and all client passwords are chosen uniformly (and independently) at random from this space. Formally this initialization is captured by de ning the appropriate LL-key generator PW . Remark 8. Since EKE2 is a two-ow protocol, Remark 7 implies that it cannot achieve forward secrecy in the strong-corruption model. Accordingly the above theorem considers the weak-corruption model with regard to forward secrecy. The resistance to dictionary attacks is captured by the rst term which is the number of send queries divided by the size of the password space. The other terms can be made negligible by an appropriate choice of parameters for the group G. 2 Remark 9. The upper bound imposed in the theorem on the size N of the password space is not a restriction because if the password space were larger the question of dictionary attacks becomes moot: the adversary cannot exhaust the password space o -line anyway. Nonetheless it may be unclear why we require such a restriction. Intuitively, as long as the password space is not too large the adversary can probably eliminate at most one candidate password from consideration per Send query, but for a larger password space it might in principle be able to eliminate more at a time. This doesn't damage the success probability because although it eliminates more passwords at a time, there are also more passwords to consider. 2
The proof of Theorem 1 is omitted due to lack of space and can be found in the full version of this paper 2]. We try however to provide a brief sketch of the main ideas in the analysis.
Assume for simplicity there is just one client A and one server B. Consider some adversary A attacking the protocol. We view A as trying to guess A's password. We consider at any point in time a set of \remaining candidates." At rst this equals Password, and as time goes on it contains those candidate passwords that the adversary has not been able to eliminate from consideration as values of the actual password held by A. We also de ne a certain \bad" event in the execution of the protocol with this adversary, and show that as long as this event does not occur, two things are true:
(1) A's password, from the adversary's point of view, is equally likely to be any one from the set of remaining passwords, and (2) The size of the set of remaining passwords decreases by at most one with each oracle query, and the only queries for which a decrease occurs are reveal or test queries to manipulated oracles. The second condition implies that the number of queries for which the decrease of size in the set of remaining candidates occurs is bounded by q se . We then show that the probability of the bad event can be bounded in terms of the advantage function of the DH problem over G.
Making this work requires isolating a bad event with two properties. First, whenever it happens we have a way to \embed" instances of the DH problem into the protocol so that adversarial success leads to our obtaining a solution to the DH problem. Second, absence of the bad event leads to an inability of the adversary to obtain information about the password at a better rate than eliminating one password per reveal or test query to a manipulated oracle. Bounding the probability of the bad event involves a \simulation" argument as we attempt to \plant" DH problem instances in the protocol. Bounding adversarial success under the assumption the bad event does not happen is an information-theoretic argument. Indeed, the di culty of the proof is in choosing the bad event so that one can split the analysis into an information-theoretic component and a computational component in this way.
Adding Authentication
In this section we sketch generic transformations for turning an AKE protocol P 0 into a protocol P that provides client-to-server authentication, server-toclient authentication, or both. The basic approach is well-known in folklore|use the distributed session key to construct a simple \authenticator" for the other party|but one has to be careful in the details, and people often get them wrong.
The ease with which an AKE protocol can be modi ed to provide authentication is one of the reasons for using AKE as a starting point.
In what follows we assume that the AKE protocol P 0 is designed to distribute session keys from a space SK = U`, the uniform distribution on`-bit strings.
While a pseudorandom function is su cient for adding authentication to an AKE protocol, for simplicity (and since one likely assumes it anyway, in any practical password-based AKE construction) we assume (at least) the randomoracle model. The random hash function is denoted H. Its argument (in our construction) will look like sk 0 k i, where sk 0 is an`-bit string and i is a xedlength string encoding one of the numbers 0, 1, or 2. We require that the AKE protocol P never evaluates H at any point of the form sk 0 k 0, sk 0 k 1, or sk 0 k 2, where sk 0 2 f0; 1g`. Transformations AddSCA (add server-to-client authentication) and AddMA (add mutual authentication) are analogous. The latter is illustrated in Figure 5 . In all of these transformation, when a party ends up sending two consecutive ows, one can always collapse them into one.
Remark 10. It is crucial in these transformations that the SK produced by P 0 is not used both to produce an authenticator and as the nal session key; if one does this, the protocol is easily seen to be insecure under our de nitions. This is a common \error" in the design of authentication protocols. It was rst discussed 3]. 2
Properties. Several theorems can be pursued about how the security of P 0 relates to that of AddCSA(P 0 ), AddSCA(P 0 ), and AddMA(P 0 ). These capture the following. If P 0 is good in the sense of Adv ake then AddCSA(P 0 ) is good in the sense of Adv ake and Adv c2s . If P 0 is good in the sense of Adv ake then AddSCA(P 0 ) is good in the sense of Adv ake and Adv s2c . If P 0 is good in the sense of Adv ake then of forward secrecy mentioned in Remark 7 is also interesting in connection with AddCSA and AddMA, since these transformations apparently \upgrade" good weak forward secrecy, Adv ake-wfs , to good ordinary forward secrecy, Adv ake-fs .
Simplifications. The generic transformations given by AddCSA, AddSCA and AddMA do not always give rise to the most e cient method for the nal goal. Consider the protocol AddMA(EKE2) of Figure 5 . It would seem that the encryption in the second ow can be eliminated and one still has a good protocol for AKE with MA. However, we know of no approach towards showing such a protocol secure short of taking the rst two ows of that protocol and showing that they comprise a good AKE protocol with server-to-client authentication, and then applying AddCSA transformation. Given the complexity of proofs in this domain and the tremendous variety of simple and plausibly correct protocol variants, it is a major open problem in this area to nd techniques which will let us deal with the myriad of possibilities, proving the correct ones correct, without necessitating an investment of months of e ort to construct a \rigid" proof for each and every possibility.
